{
  "bond_id": "stillos-correctness-bond-v1",
  "established": "2026-07-12",
  "wallet": "0x6243E363a3047173346Fa49C947Db204D4445634",
  "network": "base",
  "asset": "USDC",
  "asset_contract": "0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913",
  "bonded_usd": 10,
  "per_verdict_max_usd": 1,
  "onchain_balance_usd": 10.789999,
  "active": true,
  "collateral_funded": true,
  "custody_type": "gnosis-safe-2of2",
  "slash_count": 0,
  "slashed_total_usd": 0,
  "slash_history": [],
  "obligation_ledger_intact": true,
  "unpaid_slash_obligations": 0,
  "unpaid_slash_obligations_usd": 0,
  "overdue_slash_obligations": 0,
  "overdue_threshold_hours": 72,
  "overdue_threshold_is_a_committed_sla": false,
  "committed_payout_sla": null,
  "all_slash_obligations_current": true,
  "bond_current": true,
  "implementation_digests": {
    "digests_version": "STILLOS_NOTARY_BOND_IMPL_DIGESTS_V1",
    "algorithm": "sha256",
    "computed_at_runtime": true,
    "source_dir_is_private": true,
    "files": {
      "bond_monitor.cjs": {
        "sha256": "aa40dfde548187d24869355366301dd0e3e772f12afd1799667cdd423104e7bd",
        "bytes": 2592
      },
      "notary_bond.cjs": {
        "sha256": "0880faabb6bf49611cd610ef1846294e004dbbaadf298623e2a9ed0a3cacff9c",
        "bytes": 27008
      },
      "notary_bond_mirror_refresh.cjs": {
        "sha256": "219278cdcd3679b5a55638199fd5858aa82c32511bb7539f962098eef132f728",
        "bytes": 1177
      },
      "notary_bond_slash.cjs": {
        "sha256": "fc7d1c6d078aae894623a6569632c2256cce5a7828460353e9c20179f4198279",
        "bytes": 11140
      },
      "slash_obligations.cjs": {
        "sha256": "b91bf15812f8532dcd72325de4ae0cdcf8b2260c7875e6cba052ee9cb97087cd",
        "bytes": 11113
      },
      "verdict_dispute.cjs": {
        "sha256": "d1464796988cd22c9a6d33aae9fdbfc78e9476289051bb5ce962e2ccb519f74c",
        "bytes": 20849
      }
    },
    "bond_set_digest": "1bce85f297f972fd70095c597d43519b5979e70a18798d7de7ef24cba72819fc",
    "bond_set_digest_preimage": "sha256 over \"<basename>  <sha256>\\n\" lines, files sorted by basename, UTF-8",
    "published_counterpart": "https://github.com/stillmarcus24/notary-x402-reference-kit/blob/main/DIGESTS.json",
    "how_to_verify": "Clone the reference kit, run `node tools/verify-digests.cjs` (proves your clone matches what we committed), then compare bond_set_digest here to the bond_set_digest in that DIGESTS.json. Equal => the published bond implementation is the one this live service is running.",
    "what_this_does_not_prove": "That the loaded process image matches these on-disk bytes. This closes the operator-published-different-code gap, not an in-memory tampering one."
  },
  "policy_hash": "2b6aed8c714420922af29b84e429c4d19006195ffb78700f84fe431025ef39d0",
  "slash_policy": "A signed StillOS verdict/receipt is SLASHABLE if, within its stated validity window, its externally-anchored claim is proven false against the SAME named source-of-record the receipt cited. Claim path: POST /dispute with the receipt_hash plus counter-evidence. Resolution: independent re-run of the receipt's resolver. If the re-run overturns the original verdict, the disputant is paid up to per_verdict_max_usd from the bond wallet, on-chain, and the payout is appended to the public slash log. Because the bond wallet is a 2-of-2 Safe, that payout requires a human multisig signature and is not executable by the automated system alone; this is a deliberate custody property, not a payment condition — an adjudicated overturn obligates the payout regardless. Scope: deterministic-observable verdicts only (merged PR, on-chain event, HTTP read bound to a named source-of-record). Stochastic or opinion outputs are explicitly out of scope and are NOT bonded.",
  "mechanism": "Multisig-custodied, publicly-committed, on-chain-verifiable bond with adjudicated slash payout. NOT a trustless escrow contract. Collateral sits in a 2-of-2 Gnosis Safe on Base; slash is resolved by independent re-run and paid by a governed command that requires a human 2-of-2 signature. No automated process, and no single key on the StillOS host, can move the collateral. Independently checkable: read the Safe's owners and threshold on-chain.",
  "claim_endpoint": "https://nolawealthfinancial.com/notary/dispute",
  "verify_balance_instructions": "Independently verify: call USDC.balanceOf(wallet) on Base mainnet (asset_contract above). The bond is ACTIVE only while that on-chain balance is >= bonded_usd. Do not trust this file's numbers; check the chain.",
  "balance_source_rpc": "https://mainnet.base.org",
  "ts": "2026-09-21T18:11:58.519Z",
  "notary_fp": "21de066900082465",
  "public_key": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMCowBQYDK2VwAyEARz4QMQCVd+ImBqd3YmkIA3NYd857O+5dAWNhY7V2ryk=\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n",
  "attestation_hash": "a7ac8c6763d1e5e0bab1f7d8d898864ff51a2d82d662179ece906c47a5698206",
  "signature": "7Rz8AwoSBi5doRf3O3sOQ0Wb23wwYuEWlFcMcQovfP8uaj4ihN6z+/N5vrMVAHJK2NoJzRJKqJKP6yBJZ3i5AQ==",
  "attestation_envelope_fields": [
    "notary_fp",
    "public_key",
    "attestation_hash",
    "signature",
    "verify",
    "attestation_envelope_fields"
  ],
  "verify": "Recompute: take this JSON object, delete exactly the keys listed in attestation_envelope_fields, and preserve the order of every remaining key as served. attestation_hash = SHA256(UTF-8 of JSON.stringify(that object)). Then verify the Ed25519 signature: it is over the ASCII of the attestation_hash hex string (not over the raw bytes), against public_key. Then independently confirm onchain_balance_usd via USDC.balanceOf(wallet) on Base. Every URL in this payload is signed as served — if any intermediary rewrote a domain, the recomputed hash will not match, by design."
}